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ABSTRACT: If dialogue is a necessary condition for argument, argumentation in oratory becomes 
questionable, since rhetoric is not a dialogically structured activity. If special norms apply to the 
‘solo’ performances of rhetoric, the orator’s activity may be more appropriately described as 
reasoning than as arguing. By analyzing in what respect rhetorical texts can be interpreted as 
dialogue-based and subject to criteria of Informal Logic, the virtues of rhetorical argumentation in 
contrast to logic and dialectic emerge. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Alongside the two main schools of pragma-dialectics and informal logic, in recent 
years rhetoric has established itself as an independent third approach to 
argumentation theory. Yet rhetoric is a discipline originally devised for speeches, 
that is for larger sequences of uninterrupted one-way communication from an 
orator to a passive audience. If, on the other hand, dialogue is assumed to be a 
necessary condition for argumentation, as indeed it is by many theoreticians, the 
question arises if there can be any such thing as argumentation at all in the practice 
of rhetoric itself, which by definition is not a dialogically structured communicative 
activity, and consequently if oratory does at all qualify as an argumentative activity 
type in the pragma-dialectical sense; or else, if we wish to save its argumentative 
character, we will need to investigate in what way rhetorical argumentation can be 
considered dialogical. 
 In the following, I will first briefly sketch the advancement of rhetoric to a 
major theoretical field in argumentation theory; next I will discuss the problem of a 
basic dialogical structure of all argumentation over against the apparently non-
dialogical character of rhetoric. In a second part, I will address the question whether 
it may be nonetheless legitimate to speak of argumentation in a rhetorical context 
by asking how much intrinsic dialectic and dialogical structure there is in rhetoric, 
how complicity of audience and relevance of context inform rhetorical arguments, 
and whether the dialectical criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability of 
informal logic are equally applicable to rhetorical argumentation. 
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2. THE RHETORICAL TURN IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 
 
For a long time, from the point of view of logic and dialectic, rhetoric was not 
regarded as a peer, let alone cognate discipline in the study of argumentation, but 
rather disdained as an art of deception, fraud and beguilement. Platonic prejudices 
against rhetoric had a long-lasting effect in philosophical circles. 
 Even if as early as 1958 Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca made a 
case for a closer association of rhetoric with argumentation, the real ignition for 
what can be called a sea change seems to have been sparked in the 1980s by Joseph 
Wenzel’s theory of the three perspectives on argument: logical (argument as 
product), dialectical (argument as procedure), and rhetorical (argument as process) 
(Wenzel, 1980, 1987a, 1987b, 1990). Here rhetoric was for the first time put on 
equal terms with the other two disciplines. 
 Following in Wenzel’s footsteps, and much like Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1958) or Nicholas Rescher (1998; see Leff, 2002, pp. 60-61), Christopher 
Tindale (1999; 2004) even takes the position that rhetoric should have priority over 
logic and dialectic in argument analysis: He argues that a “fuller picture requires all 
three perspectives, with none reducible to another. In that full model, though, the 
one which is both fundamental and most indispensable is the rhetorical.” (2004, p. 
180). In his more recent book he explicitly advocates a “rhetorical turn for 
argumentation” (2004, pp. 1-27) and mutually interprets both “argument as 
rhetorical” and “rhetoric as argument” (2004, pp. 29-57; 59-87). From the 1990s, 
informal logicians began to discover the argumentative function of rhetorical 
elements of persuasion such as ethos and pathos; Michael Gilbert for instance 
developed the notion of “coalescent arguments,” which alongside those two 
included also non-verbal elements of communication (Gilbert, 1997). 
 At about the same time, the Dutch pragma-dialectical group began to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of rhetorical aims and strategies of participants in a 
critical discussion. After the dialectical phase associated with co-authors van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, under the new team of co-authors van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser the pragma-dialectical approach was extended so as to incorporate also 
rhetorical elements by way of the concept of strategic maneuverings (van Eemeren 
& Houtlosser, 1999; 2002b; 2006; 2009; van Eemeren, 2009a; 2009b; 2010; see also 
Snoeck Henkemans, 2009). The relationship of dialectic and rhetoric was newly 
defined and, by 2002, in a collection of essays, they were already described as the 
“warp and woof of argumentation analysis” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002a). 
Looking back in 2009, van Eemeren could thus rightly state: “In the last two 
decades, […] serious efforts have been made to overcome the sharp and infertile 
division between dialectic and rhetoric” and “to bridge the gap between dialectic 
and rhetoric” (van Eemeren, 2009a, p. 82). 
 Meanwhile, rhetoric has become an integral part of argumentation theory, 
and many theorists will nowadays probably join J.A. Blair in deploring the fact that 
they have “neglected the importance of rhetoric for argumentation theory,” and in 
beginning “to appreciate how woefully ignorant [they] have been of the rich 
rhetorical tradition in Western thought” (Blair, 2012a, p. 228). 
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3. ARGUMENT AS DIALOGUE VS. RHETORIC AS ‘SOLO PERFORMANCE’ 
 
Despite the fact that rhetoric is by now fully accepted as a theory of argumentation 
of its own right both in informal logic and pragma-dialectics, the predominant 
conceptions of argument available are still to a large extent based on dialectical and 
dialogical structures. The pragma-dialectical model, as developed by van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1984; 1992; 2004), for instance, proceeds from the dialogical 
concept of a ‘critical discussion’, aimed at the resolution of a basic disagreement 
between two arguers. According to this model, any process of argumentation 
unfolds in multiple dialectical moves between the two parties, governed by certain 
procedural rules. In the pragma-dialectical view, thus, argument typically and 
essentially takes the shape of an exchange of speech acts between two parties in the 
context of a dialogue. Even if the pragma-dialectical model in its most recent version 
acknowledges rhetorical aims and elements in the form of strategic maneuverings 
as used by participants in a critical discussion, precisely by insisting on their 
employment in a discussion the model as such continues to be essentially dialectical, 
which is why Blair has called this conception of the relationship of rhetoric to 
argumentation a “cosmetic” one (Blair, 2011, pp. 103-104; 106-107). 
In informal logic, Blair and Johnson, in an attempt to distinguish, as they 
deemed necessary, argumentation from logical demonstration, emphasized the fact 
that argument had important dialogical properties (Blair & Johnson, 1987). 
Johnson’s later concept that every argument must, besides its “illative core,” 
necessarily also have a “dialectical tier,” since argumentation happens within a field 
of controversy and every arguer must hence respond to real or possible objections 
or criticisms (Johnson, 1996; 2000; 2003), appears to have its origins here. But most 
distinctively Douglas Walton, in a series of monographs and articles, has promoted 
the idea (borrowed from van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984) that dialogue is a 
necessary condition of argument (see, e.g. Walton, 1989; 1996; 1998). Similar views, 
however, can already be found in many of the contributions to Barth & Martens 
(1982). Walton most closely links argument to dialogue: 
 
An argument […] is typically a sequence of subarguments used in a larger, goal-
directed unit of dialogue. Although arguments occur in a dialogue, often a dialogue 
can best be seen as one large argument. The core of the argument is always a set of 
inferences or propositions, but the argument is determined by how those inferences 
are used in a context of dialogue. […] in any given case, they always occur as used in 
a context of dialogue. (Walton, 1996, pp. 40-41). 
 
Walton distinguishes various types of such dialogues (such as “persuasion” or 
“critical discussion” dialogues, but also “inquiry” dialogues or “eristic” dialogues), 
not all of which are aimed at the resolution of a disagreement (Walton & Krabbe, 
1995, p. 66; Walton, 1998, pp. 30-34; 2007, p. 60). 
 It would seem, thus, that the existence of the context of a dialogue is 
generally taken to be a necessary prerequisite for argumentation. But if this is so, 
what about the argumentative capacity of rhetoric and oratory? As stated above, the 
system of rhetoric as a discipline (notwithstanding the fact that some of its 
individual features can also be employed in dialogical context) is first and foremost 
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aimed at the production of non-dialogical texts to be performed in a one-way 
communication situation, and addressed to a distant, passive, imagined or 
heterogeneous audience. Can argumentation be said to take place in such a context? 
What role does or can argumentation actually play in oratorical practice itself under 
these circumstances? On the other hand, in an everyday sense everyone would 
probably agree that of course there is argumentation in rhetorical texts. Otherwise, 
they would make no sense, since the predominant aim of rhetoric is to bring about a 
change of opinion on the side of the listeners in an original situation of dissent. 
Hence, either this intuitive perception is mistaken, and rhetoric achieves its goals 
entirely by non-argumentative means (which would take us back to the Platonic 
view), or else something must be wrong with the dialogical concept of argument. 
 If the dialogue-based definition of argumentation holds in a strict sense, it 
might indeed be questionable whether there can be argumentation proper in the 
context of rhetorical communication. Certainly, a good and reasonable speech will 
employ logical inferences to persuade the listeners and will appeal to their 
intellectual capacities in following or drawing such inferences. But since the 
listeners cannot enter into a real dialogue with the speaker, and the speaker will not 
have to react to unforeseen moves on their side, this procedure may perhaps not be 
called argumentation. It might be argued that such a speech consists of a chain of 
inferences drawn and presented by the speaker alone, and that such an activity may 
perhaps be more appropriately described as reasoning than as arguing. For, as Blair 
has recently defined it: “Reasoning is inferring, or the drawing of inferences or 
implications” (Blair, 2010, p. 189), or, more elaborately: 
  
‘Reasoning’ can mean the activity of reasoning, an event that occurs over time; it can 
mean a record of that activity, an expression of it in some linguistic or other 
communicable form; or it can mean the abstract entity that is the propositional 
content of the linguistic expression. (Blair, 2010, p. 190) 
 
An orator’s activity could well be described as an expression of the activity of 
reasoning in linguistic form, and hence as ‘reasoning’ in Blair’s second sense. Would 
it be a reasonable solution to our problem to refer to an orator’s activity as 
‘reasoning’ rather than as ‘arguing’? Yet Blair himself seems undecided, since in the 
same context he also states: “Argument is the expression of inferences, that is, of 
reasoning” (p. 189). The “expression […] of reasoning”, exactly what he is going to 
call ‘reasoning’ in the second sense one page later, is here called ‘argument’. Blair is 
obviously reluctant to sacrifice the idea that any expression of inferences or 
reasoning (and here we add: be it dialogical or not) may be called an argument. 
 In fact, back in 1998 Blair had taken the opposite tack when he pointed to 
“the limits of the dialogue model of argument” (Blair, 1998). After a review of van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst’s and Walton’s views on the fundamental dialogicity of 
argument, Blair takes up Walton’s distinction of types of dialogues, but modifies it to 
represent a distinction of dialogue types of increasing complexity, beginning from 
what he calls “fully-engaged argument-dialogues” of simple question-and-answer 
structure, in which “what is supplied by each participant at each turn is a direct 
response to what was stated or asked in the previous turn” (Blair, 1998, p. 329), and 
leading up in twelve steps to the most complicated type (12) of “non-engaged 
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dialogues,” in which the respondent is not immediately present, and in which we 
even “have the possibility of a whole case for a position presented in a single turn” 
(p. 331). Such non-engaged dialogues of maximum complexity Blair calls “solo 
performances” or “solo arguments” (p. 333) as opposed to the engaged and truly 
dialogical “duet arguments” of the lower types. He observes that many of the 
properties of ‘duet arguments’ (engaged dialogues) are not found in ‘solo 
arguments,’ especially that “[t]he respondent is typically physically absent, and […] 
the argument must be developed without direct questioning from or interaction 
with the respondent” (p. 333), and that some of the norms appropriate to the former 
do not apply to the latter, especially that not all of the pragma-dialectical rules do 
apply (pp. 335-336; see also Govier, 1999, pp. 188-189). Instead, Blair notes, other 
norms would be needed to assess what in that context makes an argument qualify as 
a good argument. Yet, he remarks, because of the great variety of types “the search 
for a single set of norms” may be “misguided” (Blair, 1998, p. 336), since different 
virtues of argument may come into play; he explicitly distinguishes rhetorical and 
logical virtues. He also seems to indicate that in the interplay of those different 
virtues, questions of normative priority may arise, for the settling of which context 
and situation will be decisive (see also Blair, 2003, pp. 129-130). 
As examples of such ‘solo arguments,’ inter alia Blair lists political addresses, 
encomia, convention speeches, and sermons, but also scholarly books and papers, 
any books with a message, or lectures (p. 336). His list obviously contains many of 
the typical genres of rhetorical texts. Yet he continues to call them arguments, even 
argument-dialogues. This, he admits, was only possible by stretching the concept of 
dialogue “badly out of shape to try to fit into it all of the types of so-called 
‘argument-dialogues’” (p. 337). He seems unwilling to ultimately sacrifice the 
dialogue model of argument (exactly this, however, appears to be Trudy Govier’s 
response to the problem, see 1999, p. 198: according to her, in that case, “we are not 
in dialogue.”). Blair rather complains that expressions such as ‘dialogical’ and 
‘dialectical’ are used interchangeably and expresses his (“hopeless”) desire that the 
former be “reserved for the properties of all arguments related to their involving 
doubts and disagreements”, and the latter “for those belonging exclusively to turn-
taking verbal exchanges” (p. 337). Nonetheless, Blair’s concept of solo arguments 
might be a good stepping-stone for assessing the special qualities and virtues of 
argumentation in a rhetorical context. 
 
4. THE DIALECTICAL / DIALOGICAL TIER IN RHETORICAL TEXTS 
 
With respect to rhetoric, one should be careful to distinguish between monologues 
and solo performances. In a monologue, there is no audience at all, or else the 
speaker functions as his or her own audience (whether it is possible to persuade 
oneself is a controversial issue among rhetoricians). Rhetorical texts are clearly not 
monologues in that sense. They always have an audience. But they may be called 
solo performances, since they are addressed to a non-interactive audience. The 
audience may be physically present, but passive and silent; or it may be distant in 
space or time (as in the case of a broadcast speech or a written message); or it may 
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be massive, anonymous, variable, and heterogeneous (as in a speech before a vast 
audience, an effect that is multiplied if transmission by mass media is involved). 
 One could be tempted to say that, since there always is an audience or 
addressee, solo performances are just one half of an overarching dialogue, which 
would save their argumentative character according to the dialogue model. This 
would seem most plausible in cases such as judicial oratory, in which as a rule a 
speech by the prosecution is balanced by another one by the defense, or also in 
political oratory, in which quite often opposed sides each get their say on a 
controversial issue. This construction would seem to suit all kinds of well-regulated 
debate, in which two parties are granted the opportunity to present their position, 
such as for instance in a scholarly conference format in which presenter and 
commentator reply to one another. It may even be assumed to hold for scholarly 
writings in general, in which scholars engage in a long-term dialogue with their 
colleagues on certain issues of scholarly interest. But two objections must be made: 
First, this cannot be extended to hold for all kinds of rhetorical texts: Many speeches 
are left without a reply (such as for instance a campaign speech delivered on the 
hustings by a presidential candidate, a sermon given by a priest, or a commercial 
advertisement on TV). Nonetheless they are assumed to be arguing for something. 
And second, even if there is a responding speech, the situation is lop-sided, since the 
first speaker will not as a rule know the second speaker’s arguments, while the 
second will know those of the first and will be able to reply to them directly. 
 Rhetoric as a communicative activity type, it would seem, cannot simply be 
reduced to dialectics. Aristotle, however, as is well-known, was of the opinion that 
dialectics and rhetoric were twin arts, and rhetoric was the “counterpart” to 
dialectics (Rhetoric I 1, 1354 a 1). In his view, the same kinds of arguments would be 
used by both arts, both would have to build their arguments on what was conceded 
by the addressee, the main difference being that dialectics took place in a dialogical 
frame, whereas rhetoric worked in one-way communication. A second major 
difference, however, would be that in dialectics the addressee is immediately 
present and intellectually on a par, whereas the orator’s audience is of a more 
diffuse and variegated character, partly unknown to the orator, and of unreliable 
intellectual grasp. The orator’s challenge in adapting his or her arguments to the 
audience, to believe Aristotle, is thus much more difficult than that of the 
dialectician. 
 Aristotle developed his program of dialectics in his Topics before he first 
tackled rhetoric. So, how much of dialectics is there in rhetoric? Do rhetorical texts 
have a hidden dialogue structure after all? In what sense and on what level of 
complexity can they be interpreted as dialogue-based? 
The idea of a hidden dialogue structure of rhetorical texts might even be 
reconcilable with the pragma-dialectical model, which in its more flexible revisions 
allows for a differentiation between ideal argumentation (i.e. the critical discussion 
as theoretically devised, regulated dialectical interaction) and actual, contextualized 
argumentation (the actual verbal practice situated in various communicative 
activity types, one of which might well be rhetoric, notwithstanding its outwardly 
non-dialogical appearance) (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005; van Eemeren, 
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Houtlosser, Ihnen, & Lewiński, 2010; see also van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, 
& Jacobs, 1993). 
Rhetorical argumentation indeed seems to have such a hidden dialogue 
structure. This dialogical structure is again of two different kinds: extrinsic and 
intrinsic. How is rhetorical argumentation extrinsically dialogical? To begin with, 
rhetoric, like dialectics, proceeds from a basic situation of dissent. Without dissent, 
persuasion, the central aim of rhetoric, would make no sense. But dissent 
presupposes at least two parties. Hence there is always necessarily an “other side.” 
A rhetorical text is always in dialogue with some other party, be it an opponent in 
court or in politics, an undecided assembly or jury, or a hesitant customer. This 
other party may be either the immediate audience or a third party at which the 
speech is implicitly aimed. 
A second possibility of extrinsic dialogicity has already been mentioned 
above. When a speech is part of a sequence of speeches focusing on the same 
subject, it enters into an external macro-dialogue with those other speeches, and 
there will be an exchange of arguments, even if, as we remarked, with certain 
disadvantages on the side of the initial speaker. 
This takes us directly to the more important point of intrinsic dialogicity. A 
solo speaker, or, for that matter, the initial speaker in a macro-dialogue, does not 
have the other party’s arguments and objections openly at hand to deal with them. 
Yet nonetheless he or she will have to tackle them in order to persuade efficiently. 
Hence the orator must to the best of his or her ability anticipate possible counter-
arguments the other party may be likely to raise. This of course involves a great deal 
of psychology and empathy. An orator must develop the ability to assess as 
accurately as possible the overall character and the momentary mood of his or her 
audience, so as to react to them appropriately. When drafting a speech, the orator 
will thus enter into an imagined dialogue with his or her audience and try to 
anticipate their reactions. The more heterogeneous and diffuse an audience is, the 
more demanding this task will become for the orator (see Blair, 1998, pp. 333-334). 
In the case of mass audiences, Govier is exceedingly skeptical about the mere 
possibility of such anticipation (Govier, 1999, pp. 196-197), understandably so from 
the point of view of a philosopher and logician. Perelman’s concept of the ‘universal 
audience’ may in fact be a kind of liminal case. But from a rhetorical perspective this 
is one of the great virtues of rhetorical argumentation; it is what makes an orator a 
good orator. This art of anticipation, by the way, plays a great part in the earliest 
treatises on rhetoric such as the so-called Rhetoric to Alexander, a treatise roughly 
contemporaneous with Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
But not only will the orator have to foresee possible counter-arguments, but 
in constructing his or her own arguments he or she will be careful to select the 
premises from the set of commitments the audience can reasonably be expected to 
share. It is a lesson to be learnt from Aristotle’s theory of dialectics (and from the 
Ten Commandments of pragma-dialectics) that arguments may only be built based 
on premises accepted by the other party. This holds for rhetoric as much as it does 
for dialectics. The difference, however, is that in the case of dialectics these premises 
will have been openly and explicitly agreed on, whereas in rhetoric they must again 
be anticipated by the orator by way of an imagined internal dialogue. It is clearly not 
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by accident that “audience adaptation,” the framing of one’s moves in a perspective 
that agrees with the audience, is one of the pivotal aspects of strategic maneuvering 
as acknowledged by the pragma-dialectical school (see van Eemeren, 2009a, p. 82). 
 
5. COMPLICITY OF AUDIENCE AND RELEVANCE OF CONTEXT 
 
But is an orator’s audience all that inactive and non-interactive? In fact it is not. For, 
if it were, it would fall asleep and the speech could never be persuasive. Besides 
proceeding from the audience’s own beliefs and convictions, it is another major 
virtue of rhetorical argumentation that the audience is actually invited to actively 
participate in its construction. A rhetorical enthymeme is not only characterized by 
its premises being selected from the audience’s previous commitment store, but also 
by its leaving substantial parts to the audience’s own imagination. 
In rhetoric, in contrast to dialectics, but in accordance with everyday usage, 
arguments are not fully laid out on the table in all their parts for logical examination, 
since such a procedure would quickly bore and tire out a non-expert audience. In 
fact, a good orator will rather provide the listeners with just as much information as 
they need to draw their own conclusions, supply implied premises and thus 
complete the argument by themselves. This typically rhetorical practice will not 
only keep the audience’s attention awake and prevent them from drifting off from 
the argumentative core to rather peripheral routes of information processing, but it 
also greatly flatters the listeners by relying on their own intellectual capacities in 
arguing, which will in turn enhance the speaker’s trustworthiness on the ethical 
side. To put it in pragma-dialectical terms, the speech acts of a rhetorical text can 
never be successfully completed without the active complicity of the audience. This 
implies that, in listening to a well-constructed speech, the audience, too, enters into 
a constant dialogue with the speaker. Certainly, hidden premises may be a source of 
potential misguidance, if the audience does not supply them in the way the speaker 
has anticipated. It is thus part of the skill of a good orator to maintain, monitor and 
steer this subtle dialogue with his or her audience by permanently being attentive to 
the audience’s reactions.  
Because of this essential dialogue, and because audiences may vary, the same 
speech may not have the same effect on different audiences. But audiences are only 
part of a bigger-scale factor that typically affects argumentation in rhetorical texts, 
namely context and situation. Blair has already hinted at that point (1998, pp. 336-
337; 2003, pp. 129-130). The same text may not appear equally appropriate when 
delivered as a paper at a conference, or when printed in a journal, or when read as a 
lecture in a lecture hall, let alone when delivered as a birthday address. The 
rhetorical features of the text, the complexity of its arguments, etc. must be adapted 
not only to the audience, but also to context and situation. Different norms will have 
to prevail in different locations and on different occasions. Arguing well in a 
rhetorical context also means to be aware of these differences in register, accuracy 
and complexity, and to be able to adapt one’s arguments to the particular situation. 
Responding appropriately to the requirements of audience and context is one of the 
specific virtues of rhetorical argumentation. This is in fact a highly complex and 
demanding challenge for which the ancients had one very simple term: aptum. 
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6. RELEVANCE, ACCEPTABILITY, AND SUFFICIENCY 
 
Now that we have established that argumentation in a rhetorical context is not a 
contradictio in adiecto, that it can even be saved on the basis of a dialogical concept 
of argument, we must finally ask if rhetorical arguments meet standard criteria for 
good argumentation from a logical point of view. In principle, an orator may of 
course use just as good or as bad arguments as anyone else. But since we have seen 
that special problems of completeness and complexity apply to arguments used in a 
rhetorical context, the question may still be worth asking. 
In 1977, Johnson and Blair formulated the famous three criteria of relevance, 
acceptability, and sufficiency for the premises of a good argument (Johnson & Blair, 
1977/2006, pp. 54-55; 58). In 2007, Blair revisited the three criteria and introduced 
some modifications (Blair, 2007). 
With respect to arguments in rhetorical context, the easiest question to 
answer seems to be that of acceptability. For rhetorical arguments, by definition, 
select their premises from what is accepted by the audience. Even so, since the 
audience is silent, there is a danger that the orator may make mistakes in assessing 
their convictions (or that these may be indiscernible within a mass audience; see 
Govier, 1999, p. 186). But Blair also rightly warns that ‘acceptable’ is a normative 
term, and that the question is not what is accepted, but what should be accepted by 
the audience (Blair, 2007, p. 39). This, however, puts a heavy burden of moral 
responsibility onto the orator’s shoulders. He or she will actually have to persuade 
the audience to accept what he or she as a moral authority finds worthy of 
acceptance, which can be accomplished by using supporting arguments, or by finally 
grounding the chain of arguments of the complex ‘solo argument’ on a fundamental 
value he or she can be sure of the audience being committed to. In that respect, Blair 
makes the crucial observation that the “standards to which premises are held in fact 
vary with the circumstances of the argument, and that is appropriate” (p. 41). So 
here again, as always in rhetorical argumentation, context and situation are decisive 
parameters. No universal standard for all cases may be established. 
Sufficiency, too, may be ambiguous between the sufficiency of the immediate 
argument and what Blair calls “dialectical sufficiency” (in relation to any objections 
that might reasonably be raised) (p. 41). For rhetorical arguments, immediate 
sufficiency should usually be satisfactory. As for the sufficiency criterion, Blair 
further distinguishes between persuasive arguments and justificatory arguments. 
While for the latter a higher degree of confidence in the evidence presented may be 
required, the standard for the first (more properly rhetorical) category may be 
lowered and adapted to the individual situation: “In persuasive arguments with a 
non-interacting audience, the arguer must try to judge how much evidence the 
audience will need to be convinced” (p. 41). It is needless to say that this is in itself a 
thoroughly rhetorical position. 
Relevance, finally, may be a greater problem, since rhetoric is often accused 
of using irrelevant arguments for imposture’s sake. In a dialectical situation, the 
relevance of an argument that is advanced is simply taken for granted unless it is 
challenged by the interlocutor. Yet this will never happen in solo arguments. “The 
respondent’s absence means that the solo arguer has choices not available to the 
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duet arguer,” as Blair notes (1998, p. 333). The solo arguer (or orator), it would 
seem, is free to bring forward any argument he or she wishes to, be it relevant or 
not. But is he or she? Since sufficiency in a way presupposes relevance (an irrelevant 
argument does not add anything to sufficiency, see Blair, 2007, pp. 35-36), the same 
criteria may apply to relevance as to sufficiency: It will be up to the silent dialogue 
going on between speaker and audience to determine which arguments will count 
as relevant; in other words: in order to be persuasive, the speaker will have to 
assess very carefully which arguments will reasonably appear relevant to the 
individual audience. No responsible orator may pile up arguments that are clearly 
irrelevant in the eyes of the listeners, lest he or she jeopardize credibility. A final 
problem may be that relevance is often ambiguous and multifaceted. What is 
irrelevant to one argument may be relevant to some other argument. Hence a clever 
speaker may indeed make use of his liberty as solo arguer to introduce arguments 
that seem plainly irrelevant in the immediate context, but will later turn out 
relevant in a different or higher sense. 
With respect to argumentation in a rhetorical context, it has turned out that 
all three criteria of a good argument formulated by Johnson and Blair will be 
dependent on the hidden background dialogue between arguer and audience, and 
consequently also on context and situation. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been the aim of the present paper to resolve the apparent contradiction 
between a fundamentally dialogical concept of argumentation and the presence of 
argumentation in rhetorical texts, which on first sight appear to be non-dialogical, 
so that an orator’s rational activity seems to be better referred to not as ‘arguing’, 
but as ‘reasoning’. Yet J.A. Blair’s concept of ‘solo arguments’ helped bridge the gap. 
Based on this concept, it could be established that rhetorical texts have a hidden 
dialogue structure both extrinsically, because every speaker talks to an audience, 
and intrinsically, since the orator anticipates possible counter-arguments from the 
audience and premises potentially acceptable to the audience. It has further been 
noted that the audience also actively enters into that dialogue, inasmuch as it needs 
to complete the argument by supplying missing components. The maintenance of 
this delicate dialogue should be regarded as a special virtue of rhetorical 
argumentation. The complex solo arguments of rhetorical texts were thus found to 
be completely in line with a dialogical concept of argument and even to comply with 
the normative criteria of relevance, acceptability, and sufficiency in a special manner 
with constant respect to this dialogue and to audience, context and situation. 
 J.A. Blair shall have the last word. In a postscript to his collected papers, he 
writes: “A satisfactory account of how rhetoric relates to logic and dialectic in 
arguments and argumentation still escapes me” (Blair, 2012b, pp. 323-324). Even 
more so in my case, I am sure; but perhaps this paper can at least be a small step 
towards a better understanding. 
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